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across countries, we investigate the adequacy of the single monetary
policy for each of the European Monetary Union (EMU) member coun-
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area perspective, we also show that it depends upon the underlying
country weighting scheme in the monetary decision process of the ECB
whether or not there has been a synchronisation of business and infla-
tion cycles among the EMU member countries over the years. Finally,
we produce an estimate of the actual policy weights the ECB has im-
plicitly attached to each of the member countries. Developments in
small member countries have received more than proportional weights
in actual monetary policy decisions of the ECB.
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1 Introduction
A topic regularly discussed amongst ECB watchers is the cost for the euro
area countries of having a common monetary policy.1 A single monetary
policy almost by definition implies that policy will not be appropriate for
all member countries at the same time. The larger the difference between
the actual monetary policy and the monetary policy preferred by individual
member countries, the more likely it is that the ECB will be under political
pressure. To our knowledge, Clarida et al. (1998) were the first to associate
this difference to what they call monetary stress and—in their case—use it
to analyse the causes of the 1992/93 crisis of the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS).2 Hence, stress in a monetary system occurs when—for whatever
reason—a central bank is unable to set its policy instrument optimally.
In this paper, we follow up on this and provide monetary stress indi-
cators for the euro area. Their evolution over time will supply important
information concerning the adequacy of the single monetary policy for each
of the EMU member countries. Furthermore, it allows us to construct a sin-
gle indicator for business and inflation cycle synchronisation in the euro area
as relevant for the monetary authorities. In this way we shed light on the
question whether the euro area is indeed a self-enforcing optimal currency
area and, at the same time, get a feeling for the country weighting scheme
implicitly used by the ECB Governing Council in their monetary decisions.
Following the work of Sauer and Sturm (2003, 2007), we use a state-of-the-
art Taylor rule framework which is both forward-looking and based upon
real-time information for this.
Using market expectations with respect to economic growth and inflation,
we first of all conclude that stress levels differ considerably across the EMU
member countries. Furthermore, under the assumption that the ECB takes
a purely European perspective, we do not find that business cycles have been
converging since the adoption of a common monetary policy by the ECB. In
other words, when the ECB implicitely weighs participating countries accord-
ing to their economic size, there is no evidence that the overall cyclical stress
in the euro area has declined over time. However, according to, e.g. Berger
(2006) the misrepresentation of economic size in the voting distribution of
1Of course, there are also benefits associated to having a single currency. In this paper,
however, we fully concentrate upon (part of) the cost side.
2Following the literature on foreign exchange markets and central bank intervention in
which the term “exchange market pressure” plays an important role, another way to label
this difference would be “interest rate pressure” or “monetary market pressure” (see e.g.
Weymark, 1996, Tanner, 2006, and Van Poeck et al., 2007). However, in line with Clarida
et al. (1998), we will henceforth label this difference “country-specific monetary stress”.
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the ECB Governing Council is quite large. When we take a more political-
oriented approach in which smaller member countries receive a weight larger
than suggested by their economic size our previous conclusion changes and
business cycles have become more synchronised over time.
Hence, the crucial question is which implicit weighting scheme is more
relevant in practice? It is difficult to answer this question conclusively, but
when we assume that the burden of the common monetary policy is over time
evenly distributed across its member countries, especially the larger countries
appear to have received a relatively small political weight, i.e. relative to their
economic size. This implies a relatively large weight for the smaller economies
in EMU monetary policy decisions. Also in such a scenario, business cycles
tend to have become more synchronised over time.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the way
in which we construct our monetary stress indicators. Section 3 discusses
the data in some detail, while section 4 presents our empirical results. After
reporting our Taylor rule estimates for the euro area, we distinguish between
a country-specific point of view (section 4.3) and an area wide perspective
(section 4.4). Section 4.5 discusses the main findings and the final section
offers some concluding comments.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Forward-looking monetary decision rule
Taylor (1993) established a relationship between the central bank interest
rate and two indicators: the deviation of inflation from its target and the
output gap. The Taylor rule interest rate is generally seen as a benchmark
interest rate for actual monetary policy.
When using so-called Taylor rules to analyse the appropriate stance of
monetary policy, it is important to take a forward-looking perspective. It
is generally recognised that it will take several quarters for a policy change
today to have its full-blown effect on the real economy and actual inflation
rates. Hence, instead of focusing too much on today’s inflation rate, the
central bank is likely to put substantial weight on expected future devel-
opments in their decision-making process. Indeed, when exploring different
ECB Taylor rules for the euro area, Sauer and Sturm (2003, 2007) conclude
that only forward-looking specifications (by either taking expectations de-
rived from surveys or assuming rational expectations) give estimated Taylor
rules in line with both theoretical models and communicated behaviour of
the ECB itself. Similar conclusions are drawn by Castelnuovo (2007) and
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Gorter et al. (2007). Hence, we explore forward-looking Taylor rules based
on the idea that in order to ensure medium-term price stability, the central
bank interest rate seeks to keep expected output and inflation fluctuations
at their target rates.
In our formulation, real economic developments are proxied by growth
rates instead of output levels, as is more common in the Taylor rule litera-
ture. Under the assumption of constant potential output growth, this implies
that instead of the level of the output gap, we include the expected change
in the output gap. To underline this difference, we therefore label our esti-
mated reaction function as one of the “modified” Taylor rule. For instance,
Walsh (2003) and Geberding et al. (2004) have argued that such a “speed
limit policy”, or “difference rule”, performs quite well in the presence of
imperfect information about the output gap. Given that output gaps are no-
toriously difficult to measure and tend to be revised substantially over time,
this appears quite plausible. Growth rates, on the other hand, are much less
prone to data revisions. Secondly, the use of growth cycles has the advan-
tage that they in general have a clear lead over classical cycles. Furthermore,
most theoretical models abstract from long-run growth. When allowing for
trend growth, it is possible to specify Taylor rules in terms of output growth
rates. Finally, expectations and forecasts are normally formulated in terms
of growth rates and are therefore readily available. Any deviations of the
expected inflation and growth rates from their targets will induce the central
bank to adjust the interest rate.
The formula for the modified Taylor rate i∗j,t is as follows:
i∗j,t = αj∆y¯j,t + p¯ij,t + βj(Etpij,t+k − p¯ij,t) + γj(Et∆yj,t+k −∆y¯j,t), (1)
where j denotes the country and Etxj,t+k refers to the expected value of
variable x in k months time based on information at time t. If the short-
term interest rate is above the modified Taylor interest rate, it indicates
that monetary policy is more restrictive than one would expect based on
anticipations of inflation and output growth. If the actual interest rate is
below the modified Taylor rate, it indicates that monetary policy is more
expansionary than the inflation and economic growth expectations would
suggest.
The first two terms define the time-invariant neutral nominal interest rate
in country j, which corresponds to the interest rate that would prevail if all
prices were flexible. Woodford (2003) refers to this rate as the Wicksellian
natural rate of interest. Put more practically, the neutral interest rate is
equal to the nominal interest rate that would prevail if inflation is at target
and output growth equals its trend rate. In Equation (1), it is the sum of the
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neutral real interest rate in country j and the inflation target. In line with
Woodford (2003), Laubach and Williams (2003) and Garnier and Wilhelmsen
(2005), we assume the neutral real interest rate to be a linear function of the
trend growth rate of expected real GDP in country j, ∆y¯j,t.
The last two terms in Equation (1) are the feedback terms, which pre-
scribe the central bank how to adjust its operating target over time whenever
the expected inflation gap (Etpij,t+k− p¯ij,t) or the expected change in the out-
put gap (Et∆yj,t+k − ∆y¯j,t) deviate from zero. The more expected growth
exceeds trend growth, the higher the modified Taylor interest rate will be. In
the same way, the more expected inflation exceeds its target, the higher the
Taylor interest rate will be. Hence, the coefficients β and γ are the weights
given by the central bank to deviations from the inflation and growth targets.
Especially since the early 1990s, it is in practice commonly observed that
central banks worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps
without reversing direction quickly. To capture such interest rate smoothing,
the previous equation is viewed as the mechanism by which the target interest
rate, i∗j,t, is determined. The actual interest rate ij,t adjusts only slowly to
this target according to
ij,t = ρjij,t−1 + (1− ρj)i
∗
j,t + υt, (2)
where ρj is the smoothing parameter, υt the error term and i
∗
j,t is given by
Equation (1). Some recent papers argue that the observed inertia in interest
rates may also be explained by serially correlated error terms in the policy
rule, which represent omitted shocks to policy behavior, like financial crises
(see for example Rudebusch, 2002):
υt = δjυt−1 + εt, (3)
where δj is the serial correlation parameter and εt is an independent identi-
cally distributed error term. Following English et al. (2003) we combine the
partial adjustment model and the serial correlation model to obtain a nested
empirical Taylor rule model that consists of Equations (1), (2) and (3).
2.2 Monetary stress indicator
As the ECB has to take into account developments on the aggregate Euro-
pean level, asymmetries in inflation and GDP developments across countries
will generate differences between the actual optimal interest rate and the
optimal interest rate that would have resulted if national central banks were
able to respond to national inflation and GDP growth. We call this difference
country-specific monetary stress,
Sj,t = i
∗
EA,t − i
∗
j,t. (4)
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It is defined as the gap between the optimal area-wide interest rate, i∗EA,t,
and the optimal interest rate that would prevail in country j, if it was able
to follow a country-specific interest rate policy, i∗j,t. A negative value for
Sj,t implies that actual monetary policy of the ECB for country j is more
accommodative than what could be expected using country-specific data. If,
on the other hand, Sj,t is positive, actual monetary policy appears too tight
for country j.
The main problem related to the calculation of country-specific stress is
that national monetary policy cannot be observed in the 1999-2006 period,
i.e. the period under investigation. In theory, an optimal monetary policy
rule for a country can be obtained from the minimisation of an intertem-
poral loss function (over expected future deviations of some target variables
from their target levels) subject to the current state and the structure of the
economy. Ball (1999) and Woodford (2003, Ch. 7) show that the resulting
reaction coefficients are a function of both, structural and preference param-
eters. The former relate to how the economy works, whereas the latter reflect
the relative weights of the target variables in the central bank’s loss function.
In implementing this concept, Flaig and Wollmersha¨user (2007) take the
optimal monetary policy rule to correspond to the policy rule that was
adopted by the country in the pre-EMU period. They thereby take an ex-
treme position. Besides keeping the structural parameters constant over time
and country-specific, they also assume that the euro was forced upon the par-
ticipating countries and that each individual nation would prefer a central
bank with a similar behaviour as its own before the establishment of the
Monetary Union. Hence, they also keep the preference parameters in the
policy rule constant over time and country-specific.
We, on the other hand, assume that all EMU member countries voluntar-
ily decided to participate, thereby signalling that in principle the institutional
set-up of the ECB—and thereby the preference parameters as implied by the
ECB—is preferred over the situation prevailing before the euro. Further-
more, we assume that the euro area economies function in rather similar
ways, i.e. their structural parameters are very much alike. From this follows
that national central banks would implement a similar policy rule as the
ECB, if they had the choice to do so, implying that we only need to estimate
the parameters of the ECB reaction function using aggregate euro area data
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over the actual ECB operating period. Thus, stress can be computed as
Sj,t = [p¯iEA,t − p¯ij,t] +
+ [α̂EA∆y¯EA,t − α̂EA∆y¯j,t] +
+ [β̂EA(EtpiEA,t+k − p¯iEA,t)− β̂EA(Etpij,t+k − p¯ij,t)] +
+ [γ̂EA(Et∆yEA,t+k −∆y¯EA,t)− γ̂EA(Et∆yj,t+k −∆y¯j,t)], (5)
where α̂EA, β̂EA and γ̂EA are the point estimates of the ECB reaction func-
tion.
In the above equation, the first two terms in brackets reflect what we
label structural stress (Sstrucj,t ), whereas the last two terms in brackets are
related to cyclical stress (Scycj,t ), i.e. to asynchronised short-run movements
in inflation and growth expectations. Structural stress is defined as the dif-
ference between the estimated neutral interest rate for the euro area and
the implied neutral interest rate for the country in question. As Equation
(5) shows, we split up the neutral nominal interest rate in the neutral real
interest rate (which is a function of the trend growth rate) and the inflation
target. From this follows that the difference between the neutral nominal
interest rate for the euro area and that for a specific country is due to both,
a long-run inflation differential and a long-run growth differential.
2.3 Limits
It is quite evident that our counterfactual hinges on a range of assumptions,
which require some more comments. In the counterfactual scenario a member
country, which decides to leave the monetary union, sets its policy rate inde-
pendently in an environment of flexible exchange rates by following the same
policy rule as the ECB. The assumption that structural parameters are very
similar across euro area countries implies that asynchronised business cy-
cles can only be explained by asymmetries of (policy and non-policy) shocks
across countries. A recent paper by Jondeau and Sahuc (2005) gives support
to this assumption. Using a fully micro-founded and estimated multi-country
model of the euro area, the paper reveals that structural differences in the
behavior of private agents are not empirically relevant sources of business
cycle heterogeneity across core countries of the euro area. They rather find
that differences in actual business cycle developments are mainly due to sim-
ilar types of shocks affecting the economies at different times. A similar
conclusion is drawn by Giannone and Reichlin (2006).
The assumption that national central banks would implement a similar
policy rule as the ECB—if they had the choice to do so—leads to a biased
estimate of the true level of country-specific stress for most of the EMU
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member countries at least for two reasons. On the one hand, a strong motive
for participating in the monetary union actually was (and still is) the move
to a more independent and thereby more credible central bank. This did not
only apply for most Southern European countries, which were in this way able
to lower both their interest rates as well as their inflation rates substantially,
but also for a country like Finland. The way we construct country-specific
stress assumes that these countries would have been able to gain the same
amount of credibility as the ECB, if they had decided to remain outside the
EMU. However, and more realistically, a less credible national central bank
would be forced to change policy rates more than a credible central bank
(like the ECB) when confronted with the same shock. These higher reaction
coefficients (i.e. βj > βEA and γj > γEA) lead to—in absolute sense—larger
country-specific stress levels. Hence, our stress estimates underestimates the
true level of country-specific stress (credibility bias).
On the other hand, the counterfactual assumes that the national central
bank reacts to growth and inflation expectations, which are conditional on
the counterfactual interest rate policy. However, it is clear that the observed
expectations are conditional on the current state of the economy, and by this
on the impact of the factual interest rate policy of the ECB on the member
country. To assess the resulting bias of our stress measure, let us suppose
that the individual countries are hit by a sequence of non-policy shocks, which
are independent of the monetary regime, and that these shocks are uncor-
related across countries. Let us further consider a country whose weight in
the ECB’s monetary policy decision process is clearly less than one, implying
that country-specific movements in growth and inflation expectations are not
fully taken into account. The factual interest rate policy of the ECB will only
partly contribute to a stabilisation of macroeconomic developments in that
country. As in the counterfactual scenario the national central bank’s ulti-
mate goal is to stabilise national cyclical movements in inflation and output,
this would lead to more stability as compared to what we actually observe
when the country participates in a monetary union. Hence, the counter-
factual interest rate policy in the individual country with an independent
monetary policy will normally be less pronounced and our stress measure
will overestimate the true stress (stability bias).
Of course, an exact quantification of the two opposing biases would re-
quire a full-fledged multi-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model of the EMU, which is beyond the scope of the paper. A much simpler
method to illustrate the uncertainty related to measuring stress in country j,
is to view it as a random variable and to calculate confidence intervals using
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the sampling distribution of the estimators of the ECB Taylor rule:
Sj,t = [p¯iEA,t − p¯ij,t] +
+ [αEA∆y¯EA,t −αj∆y¯j,t] +
+ [βEA(EtpiEA,t+k − p¯iEA,t)− βj(Etpij,t+k − p¯ij,t)] +
+ [γEA(Et∆yEA,t+k −∆y¯EA,t)− γj(Et∆yj,t+k −∆y¯j,t)]. (6)
In Equation (6) random variables are highlighted in bold. αj, βj and γj
have the same sampling distribution as the estimators for αEA, βEA and γEA,
respectively. In the bootstrap they are, however, independently drawn from
each other implying that country-specific reaction coefficients may deviate
from the estimated ECB reaction coefficients, albeit only in a non-systematic
way. It is clear that the resulting confidence intervals do not truly reflect the
two biases described above, as they only account for the uncertainty resulting
from the estimation of the ECB reaction coefficients. Notwithstanding this
caveat, we use the upper (lower) confidence region to illustrate the credibility
(stability) bias.
3 Data
To capture the forward-looking aspect of monetary policy, we take the ex-
pected growth and inflation rates from consensus forecasts as published on
a monthly basis by Consensus Economics Inc.3 Every month, Consensus
Economics Inc. surveys a large number of prominent financial and economic
forecasters for their estimates of a range of variables including future growth,
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. Most industrialized countries in
the world are covered and reference data are quickly disseminated. Forecasts
are made for the current and the following year. The number of panelists
ranges from 10 to 30 for each of the countries, and for the European countries
the panelists are generally based in countries they forecast.
To our knowledge, only a handful of studies have used the consensus
forecasts of Consensus Economics Inc. Among these studies Harvey et al.
(2001), Loungani (2001) and Isiklar et al. (2006) contain formal tests of
forecast efficiency. Although most studies agree that that there are some
inefficiencies in the forecasts, it nevertheless appears difficult for individual
institutes to outbeat the consensus forecast over prolonged periods of time.
3As Consensus Economics Inc. does not publish inflation and growth forecasts for Lux-
embourg, we are not able to include this country in our analysis. Given its GDP share
of approximately 0.3 percent of euro area GDP, this will hardly affect the results. In a
similar vein, it is not possible to carry out the analysis for the new EU member countries
as data on GDP growth and inflation expectations back to 1999 are not available.
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Figure 1: 12-months ahead consensus forecasts of GDP growth and inflation
for the euro area
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Source: Consensus Economics Inc.
Only in December 2002, Consensus Economics Inc. started publishing
forecasts for the euro area. Hence, for our analysis—which starts at the
introduction of the euro in 1999—we are forced to aggregate the country-
specific survey results using GDP weights to the euro area. To be consis-
tent we use this strategy for the entire sample period. As we will use the
country-level data to construct country-specific stress indicators, this also
ensures consistency in this respect. The correlation coefficient between our
constructed euro area aggregates and the reported consensus results (for the
sample since December 2002) are 0.93 and 0.98 for, respectively inflation and
GDP growth.
To implement our theoretical framework presented in the previous Sec-
tion, we need to make a number of assumptions. First, we will use the
consensus forecasts (i.e. averages of the individual responses) of annual av-
erage real GDP growth and inflation for the upcoming 12 months, i.e. in
the empirical analysis we will set k = 12. Second, we assume the tar-
get inflation rates to be constant and proxy them by the expected infla-
tion averages over the sample, i.e. p¯ij,t = p¯ij = 1/T
∑T
t=t0
Etpij,t+k. Finally,
trend growth is also approximated by its expected average over the sample:
∆y¯j,t = ∆y¯j = 1/T
∑T
t=t0
Et∆yj,t+k.
4 Hence, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that the trend growth rate is constant. While this is clearly at
odds with the theoretical concepts developed inter alia by Woodford (2003),
it might nevertheless be a good approximation for the relatively short time
4Alternatively, it would be possible to assume that either the neutral real interest rate
or the inflation target is the same across all European countries. While the estimated
ECB policy rule would not be affected by this, the cyclical stress measures would have a
non-zero mean over the sample period and the interpretation of the two stress components
would change. Overall stress would only be marginally affected.
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period we consider and avoids the use of filter techniques, which are difficult
to apply on the relatively short sample defined by the operation period of
the ECB.5 Figure 1 shows both time series for the euro area.6
We use data at the frequency of the ECB Governing Council meetings
since 1999 and until the end of 2006 throughout the paper. There are some
differences in the number of ECB Governing Council meetings during the
years. Whereas in the 1999–2001 period there were two meetings each month,
the Council only met once a month from 2002 on. As described by De Haan
et al. (2005), the ECB has a range of instruments at its disposal for imple-
menting monetary policy. To manage liquidity in the money market and
steer short-term interest rates, it uses open market operations. The main
refinancing operations are considered to be the most important and are exe-
cuted as standard weekly tenders for liquidity-providing reverse transactions
with a two-week maturity. We use the associated main refinancing rate as
set at the Governing Council meetings as our proxy for monetary policy.7
4 Empirical results
4.1 Taylor rule estimation
In this Section we determine the reaction coefficients αEA, βEA and γEA,
which are required to compute country-specific stress, by estimating the
nested Taylor rule model that consists of Equations (1), (2) and (3). The
estimation results are summarized in Table 1. In accordance with most em-
pirical studies on Taylor rules, the smoothing parameter ρEA is positive and
highly significant. Our estimates imply that each month the ECB only closes
about 10 percent of the gap between the actual main refinancing rate and
the desired interest rate level. However, we do not find any evidence of a
positive serial correlation in the error term, which contrasts with the results
obtained by Gorter et al. (2007). In fact our estimate for δEA is negative,
which can be explained by the time series characteristics of our dependent
variable.8 For this reason and as the inclusion of serially correlated errors
5See for example Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005) for the estimation of an unobserved
components model with the Kalman filter using artificial euro area data from 1963 to 2004.
6Appendix B shows the country-specific time series.
7Note that the main refinancing rate usually moves synchronised with the two rates
associated to the two standing facilities, the marginal lending or Lombard facility and the
deposit facility. The standing facilities constitute a corridor for the (inter-bank) money
market rate.
8While the main refinancing rate only exhibits 21 discrete changes over the sample
period and is constant over the rest of the period, the changes in the three-month interbank
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OLS IV
Interest rate smoothing (ρEA) 0.91
∗∗
(0.02)
0.90∗∗
(0.03)
0.90∗∗
(0.03)
Neutral real rate (αEA) 0.50
∗∗
(0.06)
0.50∗∗
(0.06)
0.50∗∗
(0.06)
Inflation expectations (βEA) 1.63
∗∗
(0.44)
1.63∗∗
(0.43)
1.65∗∗
(0.42)
Expected output growth (γEA) 1.56
∗∗
(0.18)
1.52∗∗
(0.17)
1.51∗∗
(0.17)
Serially correlated error (δEA) −0.14
∗∗
(0.04)
– –
Cragg-Donald statistic – – 1070.3
Hausman p-value – – 0.9983
Quandt-Andrews p-value – 0.2984 –
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗ significance
at 5%. The instruments of the IV regression are: iEA,t−2, Et−1piEA,(t−1)+12,
Et−2piEA,(t−2)+12, Et−1∆yEA,(t−1)+12, Et−2∆yEA,(t−2)+12. The critical
value of the Cragg-Donald statistic is a function of the number of potentially
endogenous regressors (n), the number of instruments (K2) and the desired
maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (b). For a significance level
of 5%, n = 2, K2 = 5 and b = 0.05 the critical value is 13.97.
Table 1: Estimation results for the euro area Taylor rule, 1999–2006
has no significant impact on the estimates of the remaining parameters, we
decided for the Taylor rule model without serial correlation (i.e. the second
column in Table 1) as our benchmark specification.
The reaction coefficients αEA, βEA and γEA are all statistically significant
and show the expected positive signs. The estimate for αEA suggests that the
neutral real interest rate is equal to one half of the trend growth rate of real
GDP. Given a mean of expected GDP growth over the sample period of 2.1
percent and a mean of expected inflation of 1.9 percent (see Figure 1), the
estimated nominal and real neutral rates are about 3 percent and 1.1 percent,
respectively. While the value for the nominal neutral rate simply reflects the
average nominal refinancing rate over the 1999-2006 period, it is much lower
than the estimates obtained in studies using a longer sample. Garnier and
Wilhelmsen (2005) who also assume a linear relationship between the neutral
real rate and the trend growth rate of GDP, report an estimate for αEA of
rate, which is used by Gorter et al. (2007) as dependent variable, are more continuous.
Below in Table 2 we will confirm the results by Gorter et al. (2007) and show that a
positive serial correlation in the error term can be obtained by using the Euribor three-
month interbank rate as dependent variable.
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around 0.9, which implies a neutral real and nominal rate of 3.8 percent and
1.9 percent, respectively.
The coefficient βEA measures the response of the ECB to changes in
inflation expectations. If inflation expectations rise by 1 percentage point,
the ECB will raise its target rate by 1.63 percentage points. Thus, the
interest rate policy of the ECB is stabilizing as it clearly fulfills the Taylor
principle, which says that real interest rates should increase following a rise
in (expected) inflation. Studies like Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004), Surico
(2003), as well as Ullrich (2003), which use realised inflation and output data,
estimated small reactions to inflation movements and thereby have suggested
a destabilising role of the ECB. As noted by Sauer and Sturm (2003, 2007)
and more recently by Castelnuovo (2007) and Gorter et al. (2007), this can
largely be attributed to the use of backward-looking as compared to forward-
looking specifications.9 Hence, more recent papers focusing on the euro area,
like Fendel and Frenkel (2005, 2006) and Hayo and Hofmann (2006), specify
Taylor rules in a forward-looking manner. These more recent studies report
coefficient estimates for βEA between 1.5 and 2.0.
The positive and highly significant coefficient of the expected output gap
γEA implies that above average growth indeed leads to higher interest rates.
This is perfectly in line with previous literature. Our coefficient estimates
suggest that the ECB takes movements in real variables at least as serious
as movements in inflation.
In addition to the coefficient estimates, Table 1 reports the p-value of the
Quandt-Andrews structural change test. As the null hypothesis that there
are no breakpoints within trimmed data cannot be rejected at conventional
levels, the OLS regression is unlikely to suffer from instability.10
Another potential problem, which arises when expectations for inflation
and GDP growth are made under the assumption that the policy rate will
not be constant within the forecasting horizon, is that the OLS regression
9As compared to the US, where Orphanides (2001) has shown that estimated policy
reaction functions obtained using the ex-post revised data can yield misleading descriptions
of historical policy, the use of real-time data appears to be of minor influence. Nevertheless,
by using consensus forecasts also this real-time aspect is directly dealt with in this paper.
10The Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test tests for one, or more, unknown structural
breakpoints in an equation’s sample. The basic idea behind the Quandt-Andrews test
is that a single Chow breakpoint test is performed at every observation between two dates
τ1 and τ2. The k test statistics from those Chow tests are then summarized into one test
statistic for a test against the null hypothesis of no breakpoints between τ1 and τ2. As
the distribution of the statistics becomes degenerate as τ1 approaches the beginning of the
equation sample, or τ2 approaches the end of the equation sample, it is typical to exclude
the first and the last 7.5 percent of the observations, leading to 15 percent trimming of
the sample.
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Figure 2: Taylor rule estimation
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may be subject to endogeneity of the regressors.11 This would cause the
estimates to be inconsistent. To test for the exogeneity of our right-hand-
side variables, we run a Hausman test. The final column of Table 1 shows
the IV estimators of a 2SLS regression. As instruments for expectations we
use the first and the second lag of the explanatory variables.12 The Hausman
test compares the estimated coefficients of the IV and OLS regressions in the
last two columns of Table 1. The null hypothesis that the OLS estimator
yields consistent and efficient estimates cannot be rejected at conventional
levels. Hence, we can safely conclude that endogeneity of neither inflation
nor growth expectations is empirically an issue.
The fit of our baseline specification is illustrated in Figure 2. It shows
the modified Taylor rule rate with and without interest smoothing. Except
for the winter of 2001/2002, in which both growth and inflation expectations
plummeted but the ECB did not further lower its interest rates, the estimated
modified Taylor rule appears to lead actual ECB interest rate decisions quite
well. If the Taylor rate lies above the ECB main refinancing rate, then an
interest rate increase is more likely to happen than a decrease. The reverse
holds for Taylor rates below the actual ECB interest rate.
To further check the robustness of our baseline forward-looking Taylor
rule specifications, we experiment with alternative expectation and policy
rate measures. First, we replace the main refinancing rate as a proxy for the
11Note, though, that as we know when each observations of each of time series has been
published, we are certain that all information listed on the right-hand side of our nested
equation is publicly available before each interest rate decisions is actually made.
12Table 1 reports the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic, which is the smallest eigenvalue
of the matrix analog of the F-statistic from the first-stage regression. The null hypothesis
that the instruments are weak is rejected if the Cragg-Donald statistic exceeds the critical
value. The critical values are presented by Stock and Yogo (2005). The test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments.
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Figure 3: Robustness of the Taylor rule estimation
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policy rate by the ECB’s operating target, the Euribor three-month interbank
rate. Then we take as an alternative source for GDP growth expectations the
EuroCOIN indicator. This indicator is published by the Centre for Economic
Policy Research (CEPR) and provides an estimate of the monthly growth rate
of euro area GDP. Finally, with respect to inflation, the Germany-based Cen-
tre for European Economic Research (ZEW) queries 6-months-ahead euro
area inflation expectations among German financial markets experts. As
the ZEW data is qualitative, it is converted into quantitative measures of
inflation expectations using the probability approach pioneered by Carlson
and Parkin (1975) and adapted for the ZEW data by Heinemann and Ull-
rich (2006).13 As shown by Figure 3 especially the alternative expectation
measures do vary across the different data sources.
Table 2 shows the Taylor rule coefficients when these alternative data
sources are used one at a time. The main results can be summarized as fol-
lows. Interest rate smoothing is an important and significant element of the
ECB’s monetary policy strategy, irrespective of the data used for proxying
13Appendix A briefly explains the procedure of Heinemann and Ullrich (2006).
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Euribor EuroCOIN ZEW
Interest rate smoothing (ρEA) 0.92
∗∗
(0.03)
0.91∗∗
(0.03)
0.96∗∗
(0.01)
0.93∗∗
(0.02)
Neutral real rate (αEA) 0.58
∗∗
(0.08)
0.58∗∗
(0.08)
0.52∗∗
(0.13)
0.40∗∗
(0.08)
Inflation expectations (βEA) 1.17
∗
(0.66)
1.17∗
(0.67)
1.69∗∗
(0.84)
1.09∗∗
(0.33)
Expected output growth (γEA) 1.58
∗∗
(0.23)
1.50∗∗
(0.23)
1.36∗∗
(0.34)
1.77∗∗
(0.23)
Serially correlated error (δEA) – 0.23
∗∗
(0.08)
– –
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors shown in paren-
theses. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗ significance at 5%.
Table 2: Robustness of the Taylor rule estimation
inflation and growth expectations. When we use the Euribor three-month in-
terbank rate as dependent variable, the serial correlation model is confirmed,
without having any significant impact on the remaining reaction coefficients.
The various estimates for αEA, βEA and γEA show that our baseline esti-
mates represent a good “mean” of the ECB’s reaction coefficients. In all
three cases, the Taylor principle is fulfilled. Moreover, the 95% confidence
bands of the point estimates in Table 2 overlap with those of our preferred
forward-looking Taylor rule specifications in Table 1. Thus, we conclude that
our baseline estimates are very robust against the use of alternative proxies
for expectations and the policy rate.
4.2 The counterfactual scenario
Before we proceed to the calculation of stress for the individual member
countries and the euro area as a whole, we present some empirical support
for the assumption of our counterfactual scenario that the national central
banks would implement a similar policy rule as the ECB—if they had the
choice to do so. For this purpose we estimate Taylor rules for countries, which
are not part of the EMU and whose monetary policy strategy is akin to that
of the ECB. We decided for four (Western) European countries (Denmark,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), in which in the past there has already
been a debate about EMU accession.
For the estimation of the Taylor rules we use the most general model
specification with Consensus expectations and a lagged dependent variable as
explanatory variables and a serially correlated error. The dependent variable
is the monthly average of the three-month interbank rate. As for the ECB
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Denmark Sweden Switzerland UK
Interest rate smoothing (ρj) 0.93
∗∗
(0.03)
0.93∗∗
(0.02)
0.89∗∗
(0.03)
0.96∗∗
(0.02)
Neutral real rate (αj) 0.63
∗∗
(0.17)
0.56∗∗
(0.11)
0.28∗∗
(0.11)
1.01∗∗
(0.22)
Inflation expectations (βj) 3.99
∗∗
(1.48)
1.89∗∗
(0.59)
1.64∗∗
(0.66)
2.31
(3.54)
Expected output growth (γj) 2.77
∗
(1.68)
1.48∗∗
(0.70)
1.56∗∗
(0.51)
2.64
(1.67)
Serially correlated error (δj) 0.28
(0.20)
0.40∗∗
(0.13)
0.21
(0.14)
0.35∗∗
(0.18)
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors shown in paren-
theses. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗ significance at 5%.
Table 3: Estimation results for the Taylor rule in non-EMU countries, 1999–
2006
Taylor rule the sample period goes from 1999 to 2006.
The results, which are summarised in Table 3, show that—except for the
UK—the modified Taylor rule specification is a good description of recent
monetary policy in these countries. The central banks react positively to
expected deviations of inflation and output growth from target rates, interest
rate smoothing plays an important role, the neutral real interest rates are
pinned down by trend growth rates, and serial correlation in the error term
is significant for Sweden and the UK. Most importantly, however, the results
seem to confirm the credibility bias that has been elaborated in Section 2.3:
the estimates of the reaction coefficients βj and γj are generally larger than
those obtained in the baseline estimation of the ECB policy rule.
In addition to that, the four non-EMU countries also provide some evi-
dence for the stability bias. Table 4 shows that both, the variance of infla-
tion expectations and the variance of expected output growth, are generally
smaller than the average variances over all EMU countries. Thus, country-
specific monetary policy seems to stabilise expectations more than area-wide
policy.
4.3 Stress from a country perspective
For the calculation of country-specific stress we use the point estimates of the
Taylor rule parameters αEA, βEA and γEA of the baseline regression (second
column in Table 1) together with the country-specific consensus forecasts.
Then using Equation (6) allows us to create Figure 4. The solid lines repre-
sent the case where country-specific reaction coefficients and ECB reaction
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V ar[Etpij,t+12] V ar[Et∆yj,t+12]
Denmark 0.27 0.27
Sweden 0.52 0.64
Switzerland 0.31 0.46
UK 0.17 0.49
average over EMU countries 0.38 0.68
Table 4: Variance of inflation and output growth expectations, 1999–2006
coefficients are identical. The confidence intervals are calculated as the 0.025
and 0.975 quantiles of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap
procedure with 1,000 replications. In each replication of the bootstrap pro-
cedure the reaction coefficients are independently drawn from the sampling
distribution, so that αj, βj and γj may deviate randomly from αEA, βEA and
γEA, respectively.
The figure highlights that in countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, stress has been negative for most of the EMU period. This implies
that if, for example, the ECB had conducted monetary policy for Ireland
alone, it would have set nominal interest rates almost 7 percentage points
higher at the end of 2000. At the other extreme end is Germany, where stress
has always been positive. There, the interest rate would for instance have
been 1.6 percentage points lower in mid-2003. Overall the actual monetary
policy of the ECB seems to have been relatively appropriate for countries
like Belgium and Italy. In those countries the average stress levels were close
to zero and only showed moderate fluctuations. Also in the Netherlands and
Finland average stress levels were close to zero. Here, however, clearly more
pronounced cyclical patterns are visible. Stress levels in the Netherlands, for
instance, ranged from -3 percent to 1.9 percent.
Figures 5 to 7 show the decomposition of country-specific stress related
to differences in inflation and growth expectations into its cyclical and struc-
tural components (see Equation (5) for details on the decomposition). As
by construction average cyclical stress in each country is zero, the sum of
both components of structural stress accounts for the average overall stress.
Especially Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have experienced negative
structural stress levels. As shown by Figure 5, this is to a large part ex-
plained by relative high average inflation expectations in those countries.
Only for Ireland above average growth expectations played a more impor-
tant role. In most of the remaining countries structural stress related to
differences in growth and inflation expectations either was close to zero or
compensated each other so that overall structural stress was close to zero.
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Figure 4: Country-specific stress
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Notes: The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals, which are calculated as the
0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap procedure
with 1,000 replications.
A notable exception is Germany where structural stress was highest due to
both, low average inflation expectations and low average growth expecta-
tions. Put into numbers, if the ECB had conducted monetary policy for
Germany alone, the neutral nominal interest rate, and hence the average in-
terest rate over the 1999-2006 period, would have been 0.6 percentage points
below its actual level.
Ireland not only had the highest (absolute) level of structural stress, but
also its cyclical stress was more pronounced than in other countries. This is
explained by both a more pronounced growth and inflation cycle in Ireland
than elsewhere and a different timing of the cycle (see Figures 6 and 7). Also
in the Netherlands cyclical fluctuations in inflation were, on average, rather
strong during the past eight years, with inflation expectations above 3.5 per-
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Figure 5: Structural stress
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due to different inflation trends due to different trend growth
cent during the first half of 2006 and expectations as low as 1.25 percent
in 2005. These cyclical misalignments in inflation expectations alone would
have warranted a 2.0 percentage point higher main refinancing rate for the
Netherlands in the second quarter of 2001 and a 1.5 percentage point lower
one at the beginning of 2005. Cyclical stress in Germany, on the other hand,
has been relatively low overall. Only the year 2003, in which inflation expec-
tations in Germany fell significantly, stands out in this cyclical perspective;
combined also with cyclically low growth, the main refinancing rate should
have been almost 1.0 percentage points lower from a purely German per-
spective in the third quarter of 2003. Combined with the above-mentioned
structural stress, this would imply a main refinancing rate of only 0.4 percent
instead of the actual rate of 2.0 percent.
4.4 Stress from a European perspective
By aggregating the stress indicators to a euro area level and analysing their
developments over time, our framework allows to construct useful measures
of synchronisation tendencies within the euro area. For this purpose we first
have to find an appropriate weighting scheme. From a positive point of view,
the primary objective of the ECB is price stability. This has been defined
by its Governing Council to imply a year-on-year increase of the Harmonised
20
Figure 6: Stress due to asynchronised inflation cycles
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Notes: The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals, which are calculated as the
0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap procedure
with 1,000 replications.
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area, which does not exceed
2 percent in the medium term. The euro area HICP is a GDP-weighted
average of the country-specific harmonised consumer price indices.14 Hence,
if we assume that decision making in the ECB Governing Council always
results in policy decisions which maximise the welfare of the whole monetary
union, i.e. the members of the council take a truly euro area perspective, we
14To be precise, the country weights calculated by Eurostat are derived from national
accounts data for household final monetary consumption expenditure. A comparison be-
tween the average Eurostat weights and the average GDP shares over the 1999-2006 period
shows that discrepancies between the two weights are very small.
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Figure 7: Stress due to asynchronised growth cycles
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Notes: The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals, which are calculated as the
0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap procedure
with 1,000 replications.
should use GDP shares to weigh the individual country stress levels as well.15
To be able to aggregate stress indicators to the euro area, we furthermore
neglect the sign of the stress level at a country level.16 Hence, we make the
simplifying assumption that too high and too low interest rates are causing
stress to an equal degree. Hence, we compute aggregate stress in the euro
area as a GDP weighted average of absolute country-specific stress levels:
SabsEA,t =
∑
j wj|Sj,t|, where wj is the weight attributed to country j.
On average, aggregate absolute stress equals 0.71 percentage points. Stress
levels are, however, not constant over time. Figure 8 shows how overall stress
15The use of GDP shares is also consistent with the way we constructed area-wide
aggregates of the national expectation series.
16By construction, euro area stress would otherwise always equal zero.
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Figure 8: Weighted absolute sum of stress in the euro area
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Notes: The shaded area are the 95 percent confidence interval, which are calculated as
the 0.025 and 0.975 quantile of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap pro-
cedure with 1,000 replications. As the distribution of country-specific absolute stress is
truncated at zero and hence skewed to the right, the confidence intervals around the means
(which are computed using the point estimates of the baseline Taylor rule regression) are
asymmetric. The dotted lines are linear trends of the means, whose estimated intercepts
and (annualised) slopes are indicated in each graph. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗
significance at 5%.
has evolved. In particular, during 2003 and in the summer of 2005 stress
levels were relatively high in the euro area, indicating large business cycle
asymmetries across euro area countries. On the other hand, there are periods
where stress levels clearly fell, indicating that a common shock hit the euro
area. For instance, the common shock due to September 11, 2001 allowed
the ECB to reduce stress in all member countries at the same time.
Figure 8 also shows that overall euro area stress does not show a down-
ward trend over time; if anything there is a slight—but insignificant—upward
trend. Focusing on cyclical stress only (Sabs,cycEA,t =
∑
j wj|S
cyc
j,t |), the positive
trend even becomes significant. For a correct interpretation, it must be em-
phasised that trends in total stress are exclusively determined by cyclical
stress, whereas structural stress only contributes to the average level of total
stress. Hence, this result does not suggest that the degree of business cy-
cle synchronisation has steadily increased during the past eight years. This
speaks against the argument that the introduction of a monetary union au-
tomatically reduces differences in cyclical developments among its member
countries.
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4.5 Discussion of the results
4.5.1 Structural stress and the real exchange rate channel
At least on a euro area level, stress is quite persistent over our eight year
sample. The finding that stress is not decreasing over time in the euro area
as a whole is, in many eyes, a very unsatisfactory result. In particular the
fact that in most of the euro area countries interest rates are systematically
too low or too high over such a long period of time must raise the question
whether stress is not reinforcing itself. By focussing on the interest rate
alone when calculating monetary stress, we so far ignored an important ad-
justment mechanism that operates within a monetary union. According to
the real exchange rate channel, inflation differentials between countries in the
monetary union lead to changes in the relative price competitiveness among
these countries, and hence to changes of the real exchange rate of euro area
member countries relative to their euro area trading partners. When, for ex-
ample, in countries with high structural inflation (which for most countries
in our sample goes along with a higher trend growth rate of GDP relative to
the EMU average) ECB policy rates are too expansive on average (i.e. stress
is negative), an appreciating real exchange rate may, to a certain degree,
compensate for this. An important feature of the real exchange rate channel
are its accumulative dynamics. The longer structural inflation differentials
persist, the more the relative price competitiveness improves or deteriorates
and the more the real exchange rate channel compensates (or even overcom-
pensates) the interest rate channel (irrespective of the elasticities of GDP
and inflation with respect to the interest rate and the exchange rate).
To avoid the problems related to the estimation of open economy Taylor
rules (see e.g. Fourc¸ans and Vranceanu, 2004, and Carstensen and Colavec-
chio, 2006 for attempts to take into account exchange rate movements in an
ECB Taylor rule), we address the exchange rate issue in a rather qualitative
fashion. Figure 9 depicts the average real appreciation of a country vis-a`-vis
the rest of the euro area (measured as the average annualized change of the
real exchange rate over the previous month in percent) against the structural
inflation stress (in percentage points). The scatter plot, in which the dots
all lie very close to a falling 45◦-line, suggests that structural inflation stress
is compensated almost one-to-one by a change in the real exchange rate. If,
for example, inflation in one country was on average over the 1999-2006 one
percentage point higher than in the euro area as a whole (implying a nega-
tive stress in this country), the real exchange rate appreciates by about one
percent per annum. This appreciation of the currency vis-a`-vis the rest of
the euro area counteracts the on average expansive monetary policy stance
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Figure 9: The compensating role of the real exchange rate
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Notes: ∆q¯j : average annualized change of the real exchange rate of country j vis-a`-
vis the rest of the euro area over the previous month in percent (increase indicates real
appreciation); p¯iEA − p¯ij : difference between the average expected inflation in the euro
area and the average expected inflation in country j in percentage points (structural
inflation stress). Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors shown
in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗ significance at 5%.
due the on average higher inflation rate.
In addition, the direct effect of the change in the real exchange rate
is complemented by a drift of the real exchange rate away from its initial
level, which is increasing in time. For the country in the above example
this implies that, after eight years, the level of the real exchange rate is
(roughly) 8% higher than at the beginning of EMU. The extent to which
this appreciation of the real exchange rate has a contractionary impact on
the country crucially depends on the level of the equilibrium real exchange
rate. If the real exchange rate was at its equilibrium at the beginning of
EMU, the increase of the real exchange rate was indeed compensating for the
negative monetary stress. If, by contrast, the exchange rate of the country
was undervalued by, say, 8% in real terms at the beginning of EMU, the
increase in the real exchange rate only implies a reduction of the stimulating
relative price advantages.
Due to this time dependency of the change in the relative price competi-
tiveness, the impact of the real exchange rate channel on total stress would
increase over time, irrespective of the response coefficient in an augmented
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Taylor rule. As a general rule, the longer structural inflation differences per-
sist, the more the related drift of the level of the real exchange rate would
compensate for this type of structural stress.
4.5.2 Cyclical stress and the weighting of member countries in
the monetary policy decision process
Not only the result that (cyclical) stress at the euro area level is increasing
rather than decreasing over time, but also the contribution of each member
country to total stress requires some further discussion. In this Section we
assume that the ECB takes structural differences across member countries
as given and has a focus on stabilising cyclical movements.17 So far, we have
modeled a decision process within the ECB in which the decision makers
act fully in the interest of the euro area as a whole and have therefore used
GDP shares for the aggregation of national to area-wide data. The country
decomposition of absolute cyclical stress in Table 5 shows that in the case
of GDP weights the cyclical component of aggregate euro area stress has
been very unevenly distributed across EMU member countries. Especially
the large countries, and in particular Germany, have much higher weighted
absolute cyclical stress levels and therefore implicitly have received a lower
political weight than suggested by their economic share in euro area GDP.
Hence, this analysis suggests that GDP weights seem not to reflect the actual
representation of countries within the monetary policy decision process of the
ECB.
The representation of regional interests within a federal central bank like
the ECB has received much attention in recent years. One strand of the
literature addresses the question whether there is any empirical evidence of
regional voting behaviour within a federal central bank. Berger and De Haan
(2002) show that within the Bundesbank’s Governing Council the probabil-
ity of a regional representative to vote against the majority vote increased
in the difference between their respective regional and national economic de-
velopments, in particular inflation and real GDP growth. Similar indications
for the actual ECB policy and the US Federal Open Market Committee are
provided by Heinemann and Hu¨fner (2004) and Meade and Sheets (2005),
respectively. Another strand of the literature investigates whether misrepre-
17This assumption is also in accordance with the ECB’s official statements: “We all know
that the very existence of a single monetary policy and thereby a uniform policy interest
rate across the euro area countries does not allow using monetary policy to influence
output growth differentials across euro area countries.(...) Addressing ‘unsatisfactory’
output growth performances in individual countries must be tackled by properly designed
national policies in the fiscal and structural domains.” (Trichet, 2007)
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GDP capital key equal voting implicit
AUS 0.015 0.015 0.050 0.042 0.055
BEL 0.017 0.018 0.054 0.030 0.055
FIN 0.011 0.013 0.043 0.048 0.055
FRA 0.071 0.082 0.047 0.039 0.055
GER 0.083 0.107 0.036 0.041 0.055
GRE 0.017 0.024 0.075 0.073 0.055
IRE 0.027 0.020 0.110 0.082 0.055
ITA 0.076 0.086 0.041 0.048 0.055
NET 0.077 0.081 0.104 0.112 0.055
POR 0.014 0.022 0.058 0.042 0.055
SPA 0.061 0.069 0.062 0.067 0.055
Table 5: Mean of weighted absolute cyclical stress (1/T
∑
t wj|S
cyc
j,t |) using
different weighting schemes, in percent, 1999–2006
sentation in federal central banks can be rationalised on economic grounds.
Papers by Berger and Mu¨ller (2007) and Hefeker and Gros (2002), which
set-up a simple two-country models of a monetary union, show that a per-
fect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal. Thus,
the main conclusion to draw from this literature for our paper is that other
weighting schemes than GDP shares to produce euro area aggregates might
be relevant for the monetary policy decision process within the ECB Gov-
erning Council.
An alternative economic weighting scheme could be the capital key, which
is defined as the fully paid-up subscriptions of euro area national central
banks to the capital of the ECB. Given its definition as the unweighted aver-
age of the shares of the member countries in the total population and gross
domestic product of the EU, the capital key’s high correlation with GDP
weights is not surprising (see Figure 10). Apart from economic considera-
tions, the weighting of country-specific information in the ECB’s Govern-
ing Council could also be influenced by institutional characteristics of the
decision-making body. A rather extreme interpretation of the political pro-
cess would be to assume that each country is represented equally and is only
interested in optimising monetary policy for its own population. This would
imply that each country-specific stress level receives the same weight. As
an extension to this so-called “one country, one vote” principle, the statutes
of the ECB state that the voting rights are equally allocated among the
members of the Governing Council. Thus, each of the 6 members of the Ex-
ecutive Board and each national central bank governor has one vote. If we
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Figure 10: Weighting schemes for euro area aggregation
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consider that decisions are taken by simple majority and if we assume that
each member of the Governing Council is just a representative of his or her
home country, we get a weighting scheme that takes the country distribution
of voting rights into account. The basic difference to the equal weighting
scheme is that countries like France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which were
for most of the 1999-2006 period represented in the Executive Board, get a
higher weight, whereas the opposite is true for countries like Belgium, Ireland
and Portugal, which haven’t been represented in the Executive Board yet.
The common characteristic of the two institutional weighting schemes is that
compared with their economic weights the three largest economies (France,
Germany and Italy) are underrepresented, whereas the small economies (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal) are
overrepresented.
With each of these alternative weighting schemes we proceed as with our
baseline GDP weights. We first aggregate country-specific expectations to
euro area aggregates and estimate a euro area Taylor rule. Figure 11 shows
that the evolution of expectations under the different weighting schemes is
highly correlated; the pairwise correlation coefficients all lie above 90%. How-
ever, since under equal and voting weights the small countries with high trend
growth rates of GDP and prices get a higher weight than their relative eco-
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Figure 11: Area wide expectations using different weighting schemes
Inflation expectations Growth expectations
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GDP capital key equal
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
voting implicit
capital key equal voting implicit
Interest rate smoothing (ρEA) 0.91
∗∗
(0.02)
0.87∗∗
(0.04)
0.89∗∗
(0.03)
0.90∗∗
(0.03)
Neutral real rate (αEA) 0.51
∗∗
(0.06)
0.30∗∗
(0.04)
0.31∗∗
(0.05)
0.41∗∗
(0.05)
Inflation expectations (βEA) 2.06
∗∗
(0.36)
1.90∗∗
(0.27)
1.65∗∗
(0.30)
1.99∗∗
(0.36)
Expected output growth (γEA) 1.60
∗∗
(0.17)
1.20∗∗
(0.14)
1.40∗∗
(0.17)
1.52∗∗
(0.17)
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors shown in paren-
theses. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗ significance at 5%.
Table 6: Estimation results for the Taylor rule using different weighting
schemes, 1999–2006
nomic size, the aggregate evolution of inflation and growth expectations is
shifted upwards. This shift is also reflected in the estimate for αEA, which is
lower than under the two economically based weighting schemes (see Table
6). Interestingly, the explanatory power of all Taylor rule regressions is as
good as identical (R2 ≈ 98.2%) and all the estimates are significant. The
deviations of the other reaction coefficients from our baseline estimates are
only of minor magnitude. While the coefficients on inflation expectations
are somewhat higher, the coefficients on growth expectations are slightly
lower in the case of equal and voting weights and marginally higher when
the capital key is used for the aggregation to euro area expectations. Thus,
the weighting scheme used to aggregate country-specific expectations to euro
area expectations doesn’t seem to matter for the validity of the Taylor rule
model to describe the ECB’s interest rate policy.
In a second step we calculate total stress for the euro area (see Figure 12)
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and the country decomposition of its cyclical component (see Table 5). Not
surprisingly, a weighting of the countries according to the capital key yields
results, which are very close to those obtained under GDP weights. Again,
total EMU stress has an upward trend, and the five largest member countries
account on average for almost 80% of its cyclical component.
However, when countries are weighted equally or according to their vot-
ing rights, the synchronisation results point in the opposite direction. In
these cases, smaller countries, which are given a weight higher than their
economic share, automatically contribute more to the cyclical component of
total EMU stress. As a consequence, the long-run pattern of cyclical EMU
stress changes direction. Whereas we previously could not find evidence of a
downward trend in overall cyclical stress, these other two weighting schemes
result in a significant downward trend. Thus, when smaller countries receive
a substantially larger weight as compared to their economic size, cyclical
developments have become more synchronised since the introduction of the
monetary union.
The result that the cyclical component of aggregate EMU stress is un-
evenly distributed across member countries, when we use the weights dis-
cussed so far, leads us to propose an alternative weighting scheme, which
can be directly derived from our stress indicator. For a two country case
where the weights attributed to country 1 and country 2 are w and 1 − w,
respectively, it can be shown that the cyclical components of stress can be
written as
Scyc1,t = (w − 1)[βEA(Etpi1,t+k − p¯i1 − Etpi2,t+k + p¯i2) +
+ γEA(Et∆y1,t+k −∆y¯1 − Et∆y2,t+k +∆y¯2)]
Scyc2,t = w[βEA(Etpi1,t+k − p¯i1 − Etpi2,t+k + p¯i2) +
+ γEA(Et∆y1,t+k −∆y¯1 − Et∆y2,t+k +∆y¯2)], (7)
where we replaced the area wide aggregates in Equation (5) by their weighted
country averages. As the two terms in brackets are identical, the following
equality holds
wScyc1,t = (w − 1)S
cyc
2,t , (8)
which implies that the mean of weighted absolute cyclical stress should be
equal across countries. Under the assumption that this equality also holds in
the n-country case, the stress indicators can be used to derive the so-called
implicit weights, we interpret as the actual representation of each member
country in the ECB Governing Council.
In the actual political process, the small countries (Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) have implicitly received a rather large
30
Figure 12: Total stress in the euro area using different weighting schemes
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Capital key
0
0.5
1
1.5
Equal      
0
0.5
1
1.5
Voting     
0
0.5
1
1.5
Implicit   
0
0.5
1
1.5
S
EA,t
abs
= 0.63**+0.029** t S
EA,t
abs
= 1.13**−0.048** t
S
EA,t
abs
= 0.91**−0.018* tSEA,t
abs
= 0.96**−0.018* t
Notes: The shaded areas are the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are calculated
as the 0.025 and 0.975 quantile of the sampling distribution obtained from a bootstrap
procedure with 1,000 replications. As the distribution of country-specific absolute stress is
truncated at zero and hence skewed to the right, the confidence intervals around the means
(which are computed using the point estimates of the baseline Taylor rule regression) are
asymmetric. The dotted lines are linear trends of the means, whose estimated intercepts
and (annualised) slopes are indicated in each graph. ∗ denotes significance at 10%, and ∗∗
significance at 5%.
weight relative to their economic size. Thus, these countries are overrep-
resented in the ECB’s decision making process. When compared with the
institutional weights (equal and voting) especially Austria and Belgium stand
out, whose political influence turns out to be almost as pronounced as the
German or the French. The three largest economies (France, Germany and
Italy) are clearly underrepresented, when implicit weights are compared with
economic weights. However, implicit weights are larger than those having
been derived from the distribution of voting rights or from the “one country,
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one vote” principle.
The area wide expectations that result from the use of implicit weights
lie between those obtained when using economic weights and those obtained
using institutional weights (see Figure 11). As a consequence, the estimate
for αEA is lower than with economic weights and higher than with institu-
tional weights (see Table 6). The remaining coefficients of the Taylor rule
do not appear to systematically differ from those of the baseline regression.
Although this weighting scheme lies in between the economic and the institu-
tional scenarios, the conclusion with respect to business cycle synchronisation
remains clear cut. As before with institutional weights, aggregate euro area
cyclical stress has significantly decreased over time.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we define monetary stress in a particular member country
of the EMU as the difference between the ECB main refinancing rate and
the policy interest rate that would prevail if that country would have been
able to follow a for that country “optimal” monetary policy. Instead of
extrapolating individual central bank behaviour before the introduction of
the euro into the EMU period, we are the first to assume that the actual
reaction function of the ECB is a good description of this “optimal” monetary
policy at the country level. EMU countries voluntarily decided to participate
in the monetary union, i.e. to adopt the institutional set up of the ECB. In
this case, asymmetries in inflation and cyclical output developments across
countries generate differences between the actual interest rate and the one
that would prevail if the reaction function of the ECB were applied to the
national level.
The reported monetary stress levels are sizeable. From a country per-
spective, on average interest rates should have been 2.8 percentage points
higher in Ireland and 0.6 percentage points lower in Germany. The struc-
turally lower inflation and growth rate kept stress levels positive in Germany
throughout our sample. On the other hand—besides Ireland—Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain mostly experienced negative stress levels. This has mainly
been due to persistent higher inflation expectations in those countries. On
top of that, in Greece and Ireland also growth expectations were higher.
These differences are all of a structural nature and thereby not necessarily
the focus of monetary policy. However, not only do stress levels vary con-
siderably across the EMU countries, the variation over time is also quite
substantial. For instance, although average stress levels were close to zero
in the Netherlands and in Finland, rather pronounced cyclical patterns are
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visible there. Overall, actual monetary policy of the ECB seems to have been
rather appropriate for countries like Austria, Belgium, France and Italy. For
Italy, higher inflation and lower growth neutralized each other.
When aggregating the country-specific monetary stress indicators to the
euro area level, we first take a normative approach and weigh each country
according to its economic size. The resulting indicator reveals that there
are times in which output growth and inflation cycles are more synchronised
across the euro area and, hence, the ECB policy is more in line with the
preferences of each individual member country. However, the data does not
reflect a general tendency of cycles to become more similar over time. Hence,
we do not find evidence in favour of the euro area being a self-enforcing
optimal currency area in such a scenario.
As noted by, e.g. Berger (2006), economic size does not represent the
actual voting distribution of the ECB Governing Council.18 If we redo our
analysis, but this time use e.g. the voting distribution within the Govern-
ing Council as weighting scheme, the resulting aggregate monetary stress
indicator does point towards convergence of business cycles within the euro
area. Apparently, when aswering the question whether the euro area is a
self-enforcing optimal currency area it is important to first take a stand on
the actual weight countries are giving in the monetary policy decision process
of the ECB.
Under the assumption that over time the burden of a common monetary
policy is equally distributed amongst the member countries, our framework
generates a weighting scheme in which mainly the larger economies (Ger-
many, France, Italy and Spain) have on average been underrepresented in the
political decision process as compared to their economic size. On the other
hand, growth and inflation developments of the small and highly developed
member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland) did—relative to their economic
size—not bear a large part of the overall burden over the past eight years.
Hence, this implicit weighting scheme shows quite some resemblence with
our voting weighting scheme and indeed suggests a steady increase of busi-
ness and inflation cycle synchronisation within the euro area. It implies a
reduction of approximately 15 percent in monetary stress levels in the euro
area during 1999-2006.
As a final note, in this paper we have only focussed upon monetary stress
and thereby costs associated to differences in growth and inflation cycles
18According to Berger (2006) “The ECB is clearly an ‘extreme’ case . . . the misrepresen-
tation indicator for the ECB’s Governing Council reached values about seven time higher
than for the Fed’s FOMC or the Bundesbanks’s Zentralbankrat. Without reform, EMU
enlargement could lead to even wider gaps between economic and political weights by the
2010s.”
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within the euro area. Of course, there are also benefits associated to having
a monetary union. For instance, it facilitates trade and fosters competition by
enlarging markets. It is well possible that these and other benefits outweigh
the costs associated with monetary stress.
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Appendix
A Quantifying qualitative inflation expectations
The most widely used method for quantifying qualitative inflation expecta-
tions goes back to a paper by Carlson and Parkin (1975). Their method
assumes that individual responses about the future value of a variable are
based on the respondents’ subjective probability density function. Respon-
dents report a variable to go up or down if the median of their subjective
probability distribution lies above or below an indifference interval. The
upper and lower boundary of the indifference interval which mark the so-
called just noticeable difference are derived from the respondents’ aggregate
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answers and the time-series properties of past realizations of the macroe-
conomic variable under consideration. Most crucially, Carlson and Parkin
(1975) assumed the aggregate distribution to be normal with symmetric and
time-invariant boundaries that are allowed to vary across countries. Addi-
tionally, they imposed that the average value of past realizations and the
average value of expectations must be equal, which is typically referred to as
the unbiasedness of expectations.
As these assumptions are rather restrictive a variant of the Carlson-Parkin
method has been proposed by Heinemann and Ullrich (2006). In contrast
to the standard Carlson-Parkin method they do not implicitly derive the
just noticeable difference from the qualitative survey responses and from the
statistical properties of the reference time-series, but from a special question
in the survey in which they directly query the respondents’ boundaries of
the indifference interval. In practical terms, the respondents were asked to
indicate the percentage point decrease (increase) of inflation that makes the
respondent mark ‘go down’ (‘go up’) in the survey. Heinemann and Ullrich
(2006) assume that these boundaries are constant over time and they estimate
the lower boundary at to be −0.24 and the upper boundary bt to be 0.22.
The formula for calculating the expected change in inflation is given by
Et∆pit+k =
bt Φ
−1 (DOWNt)− at Φ
−1 (1− UPt)
Φ−1 (DOWNt) − Φ−1 (1− UPt)
, (A.1)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of an assumed standard nor-
mal variate, and UPt and DOWNt denote the percentage of the responses
expecting a rise and a fall in inflation.
B Data
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Figure 13: Inflation expectations
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Notes: Solid line: 12-months ahead consensus forecasts of inflation; dotted line: mean.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc.
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Figure 14: Growth expectations
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Notes: Solid line: 12-months ahead consensus forecasts of GDP growth; dotted line: mean.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc.
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